Quick China Facts: Direction of Trade (2018-2022)
The above radar graph shows the data from the last five years (2018-2022) for Direction of trade, presenting figures on the value of significant merchandise exports and imports of mentioned countries with China. USA is the largest trading partner of China followed by Hong Kong, China.
News From Asia This Week
“Right now, Chinese entrepreneurs are lying low or lying flat. Sentiment is weak People are not certain whether the leadership is committed to the kind of reforms that China has benefited from so much.” Fred Hu, founder and chief executive officer at Primavera Capital Group, said at the Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Singapore on Wednesday15th November 2023.
Created by Decypher Team, Data from Bruegel Issue 04/2023
Sentiment scores are the measures of how positive or negative the tone of a particular transcript is.
Decypher Opinion
A Decade of the Belt and Road Initiative: Navigating Shifting Sentiments
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has undergone a transformative journey over nearly a decade, emerging as a crucial instrument for China’s global soft power projection. Officially spanning 149 member states, the BRI has faced challenges, notably highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic, revealing issues such as debt distress in developing nations. This opinion piece, drawing from the insights of Alicia García-Herrero and Robin Schindowski in “Global Trends in Countries’ Perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative” (Bruegel Issue 04/2023), examines sentiments toward the BRI worldwide. It contrasts optimistic pre-pandemic views with current economic realities and diplomatic considerations that shape global perceptions.
President Xi Jinping’s vision, unveiled in 2013, proposed a vast network of infrastructure, reviving the ancient Silk Road trade route. Initially attracting limited attention, the BRI gained momentum from 2015 to 2017. However, controversies arose post-COVID-19, impacting global sentiment.
The BRI initially garnered limited global media attention, constituting only 0.04 per cent of all China-related articles. However, after 2017, coverage surged, peaking at 0.56 per cent. Despite a decline to approximately 0.27 per cent during the pandemic, BRI-related news persists, suggesting ongoing relevance.
On average, sentiment toward the BRI is slightly positive, with a mean score of 0.67 and a median of 0.49. However, significant regional variations exist, with sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia displaying the most positive views, while the US, Canada, the UK, and Australia are consistently critical. BRI countries generally view the initiative more positively than non-BRI nations.
Regional disparities are evident in sentiment, with Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa holding favourable views, while North America and South Asia lean negatively. Notable outliers include Angola’s negative view due to economic downturn and debt distress, and varying sentiments in the Middle East and Latin America. Pakistan is positive, being a key BRI player, whereas India’s negativity aligns with strategic competition with China and its role in countering China’s rise.
The BRI’s perception is intertwined with China’s image, evolving over time due to the initiative’s impact and China’s strategy shifts. Although initially more positive than China’s overall image, sentiment toward the BRI deteriorated faster in late 2022. This decline was fuelled by a levelling effect, debt distress, and negative reporting in Europe and North America. Developing countries exhibited a less drastic sentiment drop, indicating a Western-driven change.
In Europe, sentiment shifted negatively, barring a few exceptions, driven by tensions over Chinese investments in high-tech sectors, negative reporting, and the pandemic. The European Commission responded by promoting an alternative, the Global Gateway. Meanwhile, China’s engagement in sub-Saharan Africa faced mixed sentiments, exemplified by Tanzania’s shift due to political concerns and Zambia’s blame on BRI projects for its debt crisis.
In China’s neighbourhood, sentiment generally decreased, except for specific countries like Brunei, Mongolia, the Maldives, and North Korea. India’s negative indicator contributed to South Asia’s overall pessimism. Southeast Asia remains divided, with some countries favouring the BRI. Notably, countries crucial for the US’s China containment strategy, such as India, Japan, and Australia, express lower sentiment.
As the BRI reaches its 10-year mark, its soft power impact is questioned. Despite potential benefits, including infrastructure development, the BRI’s influence doesn’t uniformly enhance China’s soft power, particularly in countries like India and Vietnam. Complexities and challenges inherent in China’s non-coercive power strategy highlight the need to understand the varied perceptions associated with the BRI.
Mixed responses across regions stem from economic gains, cultural ties, historical relations, ideological differences, and geopolitical considerations. Countries benefiting economically view the BRI positively, but concerns about debt sustainability contribute to criticism. Cultural and historical ties influence Southeast Asia’s varying responses, while political alliances and geopolitical dynamics drive negativity in regions viewing China as a competitor.
In India and Vietnam, public opinion of China and acceptance of the BRI have been declining due to factors unrelated to the BRI such as long-standing border conflicts and aggressive Chinese military actions. These countries have shown resistance to China’s influence, perceiving the BRI as a method for China to expand its sphere of influence. In contrast, Russia has demonstrated a more positive view of China, although this favourable impression is attributed more to their cooperative relationship rather than the BRI.
Critical questions about the future of international economic cooperation and global power dynamics emerge. As countries refine foreign policies in response to China’s rise, the ebb and flow of global sentiment toward the BRI will continue. Divergence in perceptions signals the complex dynamics of international relations in a multipolar world, emphasizing the need for understanding, dialogue, and context-specific responses.
Drawing on a careful synthesis of the findings presented in “Global Trends in Countries’ Perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative,” it can be realised that the perception of China’s monumental Belt and Road Initiative is neither universally embraced nor uniformly criticized. Indeed, how the BRI is viewed appears to be intrinsically intertwined with each individual country’s geopolitical, economic, and even historical circumstances.
At the heart of these disparities lie critical questions about the future of international economic cooperation and global power dynamics. As more countries refine their foreign policies in response to China’s rise as a global power and the Belt and Road Initiative, the ebb and flow of global sentiment towards the BRI will continue to evolve. The divergence in perceptions signals the complex dynamics of international relations in an increasingly multipolar world and brings into sharper focus the need for greater understanding, dialogue, and context-specific responses.
However, as we delve into the myriad perceptions of the BRI, an important question remains: In an era of multifaceted global challenges that require collaborative solutions, how can countries navigate such initiatives and their geo-strategic implications while forging cooperation that respect sovereign interests and promotes shared prosperity? This question, perhaps, is one of the defining inquiries of our time, for which the answer remains to be discovered.
China is Cultivating Friendly Foreign Influencers
James Kynge writing in the FT today, illustrates the use of foreign influencers by the Chinese propaganda machine to shine a flattering light on the country. Kynge writes citing ASPI (Australian Strategic Policy Institute)
“120 foreign online influencers whom China appears to be “cultivating” to speak up for the governing Communist party and to defend the country against critical overseas narratives, according to the Australian Strategic Policy Institute, a think-tank based in Canberra. the report goes on to say “The growing use of foreign influencers will make it increasingly difficult for social media platforms, foreign governments and individuals to distinguish between genuine . . . content and propaganda,” The ASPI report is very clear that, the Chinese state gives them training and uses financial incentives to ensure that they comply with the tone, and give favorable opinions of Chinese state, and society.
There is a gap between the perception of Chinese people and the foreign influencers but this is something that we will have to watch out for as time goes by.
The Chinese Censor Are Busy Censoring History
The Past of Chongzhen: The Final Scene of the Ming Empire by late historian Chen Wutong is a riveting book about the last Ming emperor, who in a short reign of 17 years caused ample havoc before committing suicide and helping the Manchu dynasty to come to power. The reprint of this book has alarmed the censors to take it out of circulation, and mentions of it have dropped online, the book had been vetted before publication, and the way it has managed to fall in the gaps, is
remarkable even by the Chinese censor standards. The book was republished this year as Chongzhen: the Diligent Emperor of a Failed Dynasty, and the book cover declared, “A series of foolish measures [and] every step a mistake, the more diligent [he was] the faster the downfall,” could the new Beijing standards for any unflattering comparison with past rulers of China be the reason for the book to have disappeared? Some users reviewing the original edition on a reading app, WeRead, complained about the move. “What exactly is there to fear? What’s wrong with taking history as a lesson?” said one commentator in a post. “I think he believes history has a pattern and it’s meaningful and people have to get the right idea from it,” said Kerry Brown, professor of Chinese studies and director of the Lau China Institute at King’s College, London. said to FT of London. Can history only be used for positive assertiveness? Only time will tell.
Chinese Spies Have Decided To Crackdown on Weather Data Going Abroad
The Ministry of State Security (MSS) has decided that weather stations of foreign firms could potentially be sending information about secret places in China, and must be stopped. The MSS posted a message on the popular WeChat outlining the dangers posed by the weather stations to Chinese national security, and the data law. This is the second time since 2012 that environmental data has proved a contentious matter, in 2012 it was AQI data that was at the middle of the controversy. However, MSS stepping in publicly is a clear sign of the importance it has gained under President Xi. MSS also finds time to instruct school students about photos they should not post online in spirit of national security.
Israel-Gaza war: only a two-state solution can bring real peace, China president says in speech on conflict
Chinese President Xi Jinping, in his latest speech on the Israel-Gaza conflict, urged Israel to end “collective punishment” in Gaza, called for a two-state solution, and stressed China’s support for the Palestinian people’s rights. Xi announced $2 million in aid to Gaza and called for an international conference to find a long-term solution. In line with its non-Western alliance strategy, China has consistently advocated for de-escalation and a two-state solution while refraining from condemning Hamas. Read more: South China Morning Post
China launches social security fund-backed $707 mln investment fund in Shanghai
China has established a $707 million (estimated) investment fund to foster innovation in Shanghai and the Yangtze River Delta region, backed by the National Social Security Fund. The fund will prioritise investments in strategic sectors such as integrated circuits, biopharma, artificial intelligence, new energy vehicles, high-end equipment, and advanced materials, which will be managed by IDG Capital. Read more: Reuters
China Ignores North Korea’s Provocations at Its Own Risk
In November, North Korea launched a military spy satellite, which was condemned by neighbouring countries. China, on the other hand, has remained silent on the subject. Despite the growing threat, China has not changed its approach to North Korea. This could have serious consequences for China, such as radioactive contamination and isolation from the rest of the world. Read more: Foreign Policy
Chinese economist Yu Yongding issues stagflation warning on Beijing’s fiscal policies
Economist Yu Yongding warns of stagflation in China if expansionary fiscal policies to boost domestic demand are not implemented. He believes that China has sufficient potential for these policies and should abandon outdated fiscal restraints. Despite recent efforts to stimulate growth, deflationary pressures and weak demand persist. Yu urges Beijing to focus on policies that promote spending in order to avoid an L-shaped economic recovery. Read more: South China Morning Post
China’s Defense Budget Is Much Bigger Than It Looks
China’s defence budget is far larger than it appears. According to recent estimates, China’s actual defence spending is around $700 billion, far exceeding previous estimates of $290 billion. This is due to a variety of factors, including lower domestic wages, weapons, facilities, and other budget items in China. Furthermore, China’s official defence budget does not include paramilitary forces, a militarised coast guard, or foreign weapons purchases. As a result, China’s actual defence spending will almost certainly exceed $700 billion. Read more: Foreign Policy
China Cautions Argentina it Would be ‘Serious Mistake’ to Cut Ties
China has warned that cutting ties with major BRICS nations like itself or Brazil would be a “serious mistake” for Argentina. The warning came after Argentina’s new president, Javier Milei, stated that he would not deal with “communists” and favoured closer ties with the United States. China also stated that it was willing to collaborate with Argentina to promote bilateral stability and long-term development. Read more: Asia Financial
China delays payments to IAEA amid Fukushima water release
China is withholding payments to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in protest of Japan’s release of treated wastewater from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear plant. The IAEA’s operations are put at risk by China’s payment delays, which could impede the organisation’s ability to prevent nuclear weapon proliferation and promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Read more: Nikkei Asia
Decypher Opinion
A Decade of the Belt and Road Initiative: Navigating Shifting Sentiments
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has undergone a transformative journey over nearly a decade, emerging as a crucial instrument for China’s global soft power projection. Officially spanning 149 member states, the BRI has faced challenges, notably highlighted by the COVID-19 pandemic, revealing issues such as debt distress in developing nations. This opinion piece, drawing from the insights of Alicia García-Herrero and Robin Schindowski in “Global Trends in Countries’ Perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative” (Bruegel Issue 04/2023), examines sentiments toward the BRI worldwide. It contrasts optimistic pre-pandemic views with current economic realities and diplomatic considerations that shape global perceptions.
President Xi Jinping’s vision, unveiled in 2013, proposed a vast network of infrastructure, reviving the ancient Silk Road trade route. Initially attracting limited attention, the BRI gained momentum from 2015 to 2017. However, controversies arose post-COVID-19, impacting global sentiment.
The BRI initially garnered limited global media attention, constituting only 0.04 per cent of all China-related articles. However, after 2017, coverage surged, peaking at 0.56 per cent. Despite a decline to approximately 0.27 per cent during the pandemic, BRI-related news persists, suggesting ongoing relevance.
On average, sentiment toward the BRI is slightly positive, with a mean score of 0.67 and a median of 0.49. However, significant regional variations exist, with sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia displaying the most positive views, while the US, Canada, the UK, and Australia are consistently critical. BRI countries generally view the initiative more positively than non-BRI nations.
Regional disparities are evident in sentiment, with Central Asia and sub-Saharan Africa holding favourable views, while North America and South Asia lean negatively. Notable outliers include Angola’s negative view due to economic downturn and debt distress, and varying sentiments in the Middle East and Latin America. Pakistan is positive, being a key BRI player, whereas India’s negativity aligns with strategic competition with China and its role in countering China’s rise.
The BRI’s perception is intertwined with China’s image, evolving over time due to the initiative’s impact and China’s strategy shifts. Although initially more positive than China’s overall image, sentiment toward the BRI deteriorated faster in late 2022. This decline was fuelled by a levelling effect, debt distress, and negative reporting in Europe and North America. Developing countries exhibited a less drastic sentiment drop, indicating a Western-driven change.
In Europe, sentiment shifted negatively, barring a few exceptions, driven by tensions over Chinese investments in high-tech sectors, negative reporting, and the pandemic. The European Commission responded by promoting an alternative, the Global Gateway. Meanwhile, China’s engagement in sub-Saharan Africa faced mixed sentiments, exemplified by Tanzania’s shift due to political concerns and Zambia’s blame on BRI projects for its debt crisis.
In China’s neighbourhood, sentiment generally decreased, except for specific countries like Brunei, Mongolia, the Maldives, and North Korea. India’s negative indicator contributed to South Asia’s overall pessimism. Southeast Asia remains divided, with some countries favouring the BRI. Notably, countries crucial for the US’s China containment strategy, such as India, Japan, and Australia, express lower sentiment.
As the BRI reaches its 10-year mark, its soft power impact is questioned. Despite potential benefits, including infrastructure development, the BRI’s influence doesn’t uniformly enhance China’s soft power, particularly in countries like India and Vietnam. Complexities and challenges inherent in China’s non-coercive power strategy highlight the need to understand the varied perceptions associated with the BRI.
Mixed responses across regions stem from economic gains, cultural ties, historical relations, ideological differences, and geopolitical considerations. Countries benefiting economically view the BRI positively, but concerns about debt sustainability contribute to criticism. Cultural and historical ties influence Southeast Asia’s varying responses, while political alliances and geopolitical dynamics drive negativity in regions viewing China as a competitor.
In India and Vietnam, public opinion of China and acceptance of the BRI have been declining due to factors unrelated to the BRI such as long-standing border conflicts and aggressive Chinese military actions. These countries have shown resistance to China’s influence, perceiving the BRI as a method for China to expand its sphere of influence. In contrast, Russia has demonstrated a more positive view of China, although this favourable impression is attributed more to their cooperative relationship rather than the BRI.
Critical questions about the future of international economic cooperation and global power dynamics emerge. As countries refine foreign policies in response to China’s rise, the ebb and flow of global sentiment toward the BRI will continue. Divergence in perceptions signals the complex dynamics of international relations in a multipolar world, emphasizing the need for understanding, dialogue, and context-specific responses.
Drawing on a careful synthesis of the findings presented in “Global Trends in Countries’ Perceptions of the Belt and Road Initiative,” it can be realised that the perception of China’s monumental Belt and Road Initiative is neither universally embraced nor uniformly criticized. Indeed, how the BRI is viewed appears to be intrinsically intertwined with each individual country’s geopolitical, economic, and even historical circumstances.
At the heart of these disparities lie critical questions about the future of international economic cooperation and global power dynamics. As more countries refine their foreign policies in response to China’s rise as a global power and the Belt and Road Initiative, the ebb and flow of global sentiment towards the BRI will continue to evolve. The divergence in perceptions signals the complex dynamics of international relations in an increasingly multipolar world and brings into sharper focus the need for greater understanding, dialogue, and context-specific responses.
However, as we delve into the myriad perceptions of the BRI, an important question remains: In an era of multifaceted global challenges that require collaborative solutions, how can countries navigate such initiatives and their geo-strategic implications while forging cooperation that respect sovereign interests and promotes shared prosperity? This question, perhaps, is one of the defining inquiries of our time, for which the answer remains to be discovered.
Decypher Context
Is China Really Going To Back Off from Taiwan? The two years Xi uses a lot hold the key
Mr. Katsuji Nakazawa of Nikkei has an interesting column in which he discusses the Chinese politics, this week in an excellent opinion piece he examines the context of President Xi Jinping’s remarks made while he met President Biden. We examine the remarks, context, and implications.
“I hear all these reports in the United States how we’re planning for military action [against Taiwan] in 2027 or 2035” President Xi Jinping in the United States
The Context by Katsuji Nakazawa:
In his opinion piece Mr. Nakazawa explains the statement as being the proverbial elephant and the blind people, as different things meant different things to people.
“In California and Washington, many officials and executives, including American business heavyweights who had listened to Xi’s speech in San Francisco the night before, seemed to have accepted the denial of invasion plans at face value.
However, Xi did not refer to renouncing the use of force against Taiwan. His stated intentions toward Taiwan remain basically unchanged.
No wonder, then, that completely different reactions emerged from sources familiar with China’s domestic politics. One source said Xi made the Taiwan remarks as part of a “careful and farsighted” strategy, “calculating their effects on domestic politics.” The source said it was also strategic for Xi to mention that he knows what U.S. officials have been talking about.” (Nikkei)
Two years stand out that President Xi emphasised and has been since he took over the second term in 2017 these years are; 2027, & 2035. Mr. Nakazawa further explains the significance of these two years for Mr. Jinping as such:
“Knowing what the years 2027 and 2035 represent helps us to understand Xi’s remarks. He has been referring to these years since the Chinese Communist Party’s 19th National Congress in 2017, when he secured his second term as party chief.
2027 marks the 100th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Liberation Army and has been set as a milestone year for China’s military development.
The party’s next quinquennial national congress will also be held in 2027. When Xi refers to this future time, he most likely envisages being granted a fourth term as China’s top leader at the congress.
More problematic is the year 2035. At the party’s national congress in 2017, Xi effectively set 2035 as the ambitious target year for China to catch up with and overtake the U.S. on both the military and economic fronts.
The party’s 22nd national congress falls between those years, in 2032, and Xi’s reference to 2027 and 2035 is tantamount to declaring his bid for fourth and fifth terms as China’s top leader.
Xi is to turn 83 in 2035, or 82 under the Western system of calculating age.
This is the exact age at which Mao Zedong, Communist China’s founding father, died. If Xi continues to reign until 2035, catching up with Mao in terms of achievements will not be a dream.” (Nikkei)
What It Means For The World?
There has been for sometime pressure on Xi Jinping from party elders, and fellow ” red princelings” on party, diplomatic, and economic affairs of the country. The mood in CCP has soured over the perceived failures of Xi Jinping and this has pushed him to reach out and make peace with the wider world. The message that Xi Jinping has clearly spelt out to the US president but most importantly US politicians is that there seems to be no room for negotiation and the policy will continue under his leadership for a long time to come. The Chinese leadership uses foreign visits to make policy statements back home, and this time has been no different but it has been strange nonetheless to make his intentions of long reign clear. The clear statement on Taiwan is a strategy to buy time and perhaps plan a clear route and till 2027 no misadventures in the Taiwan strait. The China calculus has just shifted upwards.
Analysing China’s Expanding Foreign Aid
Quick Takeaway: China’s growing influence as a global player through its foreign aid programs warrants scrutiny, particularly with its opaque foreign aid flow data and lack of objective evaluation metrics. The Belt and Road Initiative’s infrastructural development, trade, and economic growth objectives also raise questions about its underlying motivations. Comprehensive and unbiased assessments of Chinese foreign aid are hindered by these factors, thus shrouding its intentions and perceived altruism in ambiguity.
China views itself as a global power and its foreign aid strategy reflects this ambition to match that aspiration. Through its evolving foreign aid program, China has leveraged economic assistance to strategically advance its national interests and expand its global influence. While criticisms of Chinese aid are not unfounded, there is no denying its tangible impact on infrastructure development and economic growth in recipient countries. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), in particular, has emerged as a cornerstone of China’s foreign aid strategy, with the potential to significantly shape the future of global geopolitics one way or another.
As 2023 draws to a close, we tale a close look at China’s foreign aid data to see where it is headed. The data in “China’s Third White Paper on Foreign Aid” reveals a clear increase in China’s foreign aid spending over the years. From 1950-2009, China provided 256.3 billion yuan ($73.6 billion in US dollars) in grant aid, interest-free loans, and concessional loans. However, from 2010-2012, China altered its foreign aid strategy, decreasing grant aid and increasing interest-free loans and concessional loans, providing 89.3 billion yuan ($15.2 billion) in aid during this period. However, it was in the period of 2013-2018 that China’s foreign aid saw a substantial increase. The total aid provided during this time amounted to 270.2 billion yuan, which is approximately 42 billion US dollars. This significant increase in Chinese foreign aid reflects China’s growing economic prowess and its desire to exert influence on the global stage.
The shifting landscape of Chinese aid dispersal holds significant global implications.
China’s infrastructure aid strategy involves active participation from recipient nations through a “self-build” model, also known as the ‘locally constructed model’ by UNDP. While this approach aims to empower aid recipients, there is limited data evaluating the long-term impact and effectiveness of such projects in sectors like health and education.
With the outpour of $498 billion in loans between 2008 and 2021, the impact of Chinese aid cannot be understated. While concerns regarding transparency, social standards, and political interference persist, the fact remains that Chinese assistance has played a critical role in infrastructural progress and socio-economic transformation in many developing countries. The Belt-and-Road initiative, in particular, has been transformative in reshaping the landscapes of many nations. Despite providing billions of dollars in loans, questions remain about China’s motivations and methods, underscoring the need for greater transparency and accountability in the global aid system.
Thank You for Reading!!!
